Does foreign aid harm political institutions?  by Jones, Sam & Tarp, Finn
Journal of Development Economics 118 (2016) 266–281
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Development Economics
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /devecRegular ArticleDoes foreign aid harm political institutions?☆Sam Jones a, Finn Tarp a,b,⁎
a Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353, Denmark
b UNU-WIDER, Katajanokanlaituri 6B, FI-00160 Helsinki, Finland☆ We are grateful to the Editor and two anonymous refe
feedback and constructive suggestions. All errors are our
⁎ Corresponding author at: UNU-WIDER, Katajanoka
Finland. Tel.: +358 45 1108008; fax: +358 9 615 99 333
E-mail address: tarp@wider.unu.edu (F. Tarp).
1 These empirical results also are consistent with simu
theoretical model (see Arndt, 2015b).
2 For a recent review of this literature see Ravallion (20
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.09.004
0304-3878/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.Va b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 2 April 2015
Received in revised form 28 August 2015
Accepted 26 September 2015
Available online 8 October 2015
Keywords:
Foreign aid
Governance
Institutions
Government qualityThe notion that foreign aid harms the institutions of recipient governments remains prevalent.We combine new
disaggregated aid data and various metrics of political institutions to re-examine this relationship. Long run
cross-section and alternative dynamic panel estimators show a small positive net effect of total aid on political
institutions. Distinguishing between types of aid according to their frequency domain and stated objectives,
we ﬁnd that this aggregate net effect is driven primarily by the positive contribution of more stable inﬂows of
‘governance aid’. We conclude that the data do not support the view that aid has had a systematic negative effect
on political institutions.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The impact of foreign aid on aggregate economic outcomes has
spawned a vast literature,much of it polemical. Even so, the set of recently
published empirical studies concerning the effect of aid on growth draws
broadly similar conclusions. Applying different methods and data, they
ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of aid when considered
over the long-run (Arndt, 2015a; Arndt et al., 2010; Juselius et al., 2014;
Brückner, 2013; Clemens et al., 2012; Minoiu and Reddy, 2010).1 While
this strandof literature shows someconvergence, important questions re-
main. One of these is whether foreign aid has a negative effect on political
institutions. While one might ﬁnd a positive overall effect of aid on eco-
nomic growth, this could be compatible with a decline in governance
quality that may have negative implications over the very long-term.
A popular version of the thesis that aid undermines governance is
spelled out by Moss et al. (2008).2 They propose that governments
less dependent on internal sources of revenue tend to be less account-
able to their citizens and face weaker incentives to nurture effective
public institutions. Put differently, aid may undermine incentives to
tackle collective-action problems that constitute institutional barriers
to development (Booth, 2011). A number of scholars consider the hy-
pothesis that aid weakens the quality of political institutions to be per-
tinent (e.g., Rajan and Subramanian, 2007; Deaton, 2013). Nonetheless,rees for the extremely valuable
own.
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lation evidence from a general
14).
. This is an open access article underempirical treatments of this question provide mixed answers. In
the economics literature, both Djankov et al. (2008) and Busse and
Gröning (2009) ﬁnd a direct negative effect of aid on institutions. How-
ever, Tavares (2003) reports that aid decreases corruption while Knack
(2004) ﬁnds that it has no impact onmeasures of democracy. Empirical
evidence from political science also does not reach a consensus (e.g., see
Wright, 2009); (de Mesquita and Smith, 2013).
The present paper takes advantage of new and more extensive data
on aid ﬂows covering a period of over 25 years. We ask twomain ques-
tions: (1) What has been the relationship between aid inﬂows and
political institutions over the period 1983–2010?And (2) does this rela-
tionship vary according to the type of aid ﬂow? The former question
addresses the ﬁrst order challenge of measuring the (average) direction
andmagnitude of the links between aggregate aid and institutional out-
comes. The latter question is motivated by the heterogeneity of aid
(e.g., Mavrotas and Nunnenkamp, 2007). Here, two speciﬁc aspects
are in focus. First is the extent towhich aidﬂows are predictable (stable)
or transitory in nature. A large literature has found that aid volatility is
high and is likely to undermine its effectiveness (Arellano et al., 2009;
Bulr and Hamann, 2008). In part, this may reﬂect donor fragmentation,
which has been shown to harm recipient-government bureaucratic
quality (Djankov et al., 2009; Knack and Rahman, 2007). Furthermore,
Brückner et al. (2012) show that the evolution of institutions depends
on whether changes to income are permanent or temporary. This is
particularly germane given the body of evidence that aid can raise ag-
gregate incomes. Consequently, we use a simple decomposition of aid
ﬂows to investigate whether the effect of aid on institutional outcomes
differs between high and low frequency domains.3 The second aspect of3 We are grateful to an anonymous referee and the JDE Editor for recommending this
analytical path.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
267S. Jones, F. Tarp / Journal of Development Economics 118 (2016) 266–281heterogeneity concerns differences in the objectives of aid. As Clemens
et al. (2012) note, among others, the stated objectives of aid are highly
diverse — often encompassing multiple sectors and different time
horizons. As a result, we explore whether the link between aid and
institutions depends on the objectives of aid, hypothesizing that there
may be a stronger link where aid is explicitly targeted at governance
or institutional development outcomes.
Tohelp answer our two questions, Section 2 beginswith a discussion
of the potential mechanisms through which aid may have an effect
on institutional development. This suggests that the (net) direction
of such effects is ambiguous and that not all aid is the same.
Different types of aid – e.g., given by different donors or for alternative
objectives – are likely to hold different political economy implications.
Section 3 describes our empirical strategy, focusing on a range of rele-
vant technical challenges, particularly those associated with the time-
series cross-section nature of the available data. We recognize upfront
that no single empirical strategy is unproblematic. Therefore, we verify
the relationship between aid and institutional outcomes using a range
of methods. Speciﬁcally, we follow previous studies and use long-run
cross-section estimates (e.g., Knack, 2004). These are supplemented
by various dynamic panel estimators,which are run over panels ranging
from two to eight years in duration.
Section 4 provides an overview of our data. We clarify what we
meanby political institutions and how it ismeasured.We also introduce
a new disaggregation of aid according to its stated objectives and de-
scribe a simple method to decompose aid into lower and higher fre-
quency components. Our main results are reported in Section 5. With
respect to the relationship between aggregate aid and a synthetic
(mean)measure of political institutions, both the long-run and dynamic
panel estimates consistently point to a small positive net effect due to
aid as a share of income (Aid/GDP). In keeping with Dietrich (2015),
we ﬁnd that different types of aid hold different implications for gover-
nance outcomes. Speciﬁcally, low frequency (more stable) ﬂows of ‘gov-
ernance aid’ have a larger but moderate positive association with
political institutional outcomes. Aid that is more volatile seems to be
less effective. Also, we ﬁnd no clear systematic effects associated with
aid given for other purposes. Taken together, this helps explain why
the net effect of aid on institutions appears to be small but positive.
Section 6 explicitly considers a number of more speciﬁc aspects of
robustness. These are: differences in the effects of aid over alternative
sub-measures of institutions; heterogeneity in responses via interaction
effects (e.g., over time); and whether our ﬁndings may reﬂect latent
trends in institutions. Overall, our results hold up to these checks.
Section 7 concludes.
2. Mechanisms
Previous studies have suggested a variety of mechanisms through
which foreign aid may inﬂuence the quality of political institutions.
Here we provide a brief overview of these ideas and reﬂect on their
implications.4 A common point of departure is the notion that gover-
nance quality is chosen by incumbent political elites to optimize their
expected utility, subject to relevant constraints. It follows that changes
in aid ﬂows can alter the political calculus, potentially inducing a shift
in the optimal choice of institutions. While different studies emphasize
alternative aspects of the choice over institutions, two general mecha-
nisms can be distinguished.
First, following the social compact literature (e.g., Moore, 2004),
higher quality institutions are often associated with enhanced and/or
more cost-efﬁcient domestic revenue collection. The relevant logic
is that increases in aid can substitute for domestic revenue, in turn
enabling institutional quality to decline. This mechanism provides a
foundation for treatments of aid as a rent with similar properties and4 For reviews of the relevant literature see Licht (2010); Scott and Steele (2011);
Ravallion (2014); Bader and Faust (2014); and Dietrich (2015).institutional effects to natural resource discoveries. Such a view is ex-
plicitly found in the selectorate theory of politics due to de Mesquita
et al. (2003), also echoed elsewhere (e.g., de Mesquita and Smith,
2013; Djankov et al., 2008; Morrison, 2007).
Few proponents of this mechanism would suggest that a negative
link running from aid to institutions holds unconditionally. Rather, it is
most often applied only to non-democratic regimes. That is, initial con-
ditions matter. Further considerations warn against a simplistic version
of thismechanism. Characterizations of aid as a resource rent tend to re-
quire that aid is fungible. While some degree of fungibility is plausible,
evidence suggests that expenditures ﬁnanced out of aid are more
constrained than those out of domestic revenues. This relates to condi-
tions imposed by donors on both aid allocations (across recipients) and
its uses (between sectors).5 These distinctive features of aid lead
Altincekic and Bearce (2014) to reject the thesis of a political foreign
aid curse. Furthermore, if aid is an important component of the budget
and the volume of inﬂows is effectively conditional on governance out-
comes, then aid may act to constrain institutional deterioration or even
encourage improvements. In the latter case, the logic is that the utility
cost to the leader of having better institutions is (more than) offset by
a larger revenue stream.
The second mechanism focuses on political survival, which is often
taken to be a function of the resources leaders command and the
amount of discretion over their use. In this sense, access to aid ﬂows
can inﬂuence the balance of political competition. By way of example,
Licht (2010) ﬁnds that aid can help consolidate the support base of
recently-elected leaders. Faye and Niehaus (2012) point to a donor-
elite match effect, whereby (incumbent) administrations more closely
aligned with donor interests tend to receive greater aid during compet-
itive elections. Alternatively, Scott and Steele (2011) note that certain
donors have acted as ‘democratic sponsor states’, explicitly deploying
aid to foster institutional change via multiple channels. These include
support to extra-governmental activities, which may stimulate popular
demand for institutional change. In turn, in order to remain in power,
leaders may seek to accommodate grassroots demands for change,
fuelled by aid-ﬁnanced activities.
Three implications emerge from this brief review. First, we ﬁnd little
theoretical reason to expect a simple, uni-directional effect of aid on in-
stitutions. The political calculus underlying institutional choices is com-
plex, and aid can affect this calculus in many ways. Existing empirical
evidence lends support to such a nuanced view. For instance, Dutta
et al. (2013) ﬁnd that foreign aid acts to amplify existing political–
institutional arrangements. Wright (2009) goes further, arguing that
foreign aid can support democratization even among dictatorships, as
long as the latter have a good chance of winning multi-party elections.
Second, aid cannot be considered a homogenous good. Rather, the
institutional effects of aid are likely to depend on the type of aid
delivered and associated conditions. For instance, a variety of studies
suggest that democracy assistance programmes may be particularly
critical to support institutional change or consolidation (for elaboration
see Finkel, 2003; Savun and Tirone, 2011; Dietrich, 2015; Gibson et al.,
2015). Empirically, this implies that a focus on aggregate aid ﬂows
may be deceptive.
Third, the credibility of aid is likely to matter. For instance, if
aid supplies are primarily driven by the short-term strategic interests
of donors, any associated institutional conditions or ostensible commit-
ments to long-run institutional development are unlikely to be credible.
As noted previously, empirical evidence suggests the volatility of
aid ﬂows imposes a welfare cost on recipients. Celasun and Walliser
(2008) suggest that aid volatility shifts aid expenditures toward recur-
rent expenditure rather than investments. Additionally, Kangoye
(2013) ﬁnds a positive link between higher aid unpredictability and5 SeeWright andWinters (2010) for a reviewof recent literature regarding the fungibil-
ity of aid and conditions imposed on allocations.
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into higher and lower frequency components.
3. Empirical strategy
To analyze the relationship between foreign aid and institutional
outcomes, our starting point is the following general speciﬁcation:
INST jt ¼ ρINST j;t−m þ βAID j;t−n þ γ0Z j;t−p þ μ j þ ϕt þ ε jt
m ∈ ℤþ;n ∈ 0;ℤþf g; p ∈ 0;ℤþf g
ð1Þ
where INST is a continuous measure of institutions; j indexes countries;
t is time; AID is a measure of aid inputs (normalized by income); Z is
a vector of control variables; μ and ϕ respectively capture country and
period ﬁxed effects; and ε is residual error. This represents a basic
autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) structure, which is recommended
for general use in time-series cross-section settings containing either
stationary or non-stationary series (Beck and Katz, 2011; De Boef and
Keele, 2008; Judson and Owen, 1999).6
Versions of this speciﬁcation have been used in previous similar
studies. Knack (2004), for example, employs a cross-section version of
Eq. (1) to investigate the relationship between aid and democracy. To
do so, he deﬁnes t − m to correspond to the initial period and subtracts
initial institutions from both sides, yielding the long period change
in democracy as the outcome. Djankov et al. (2008) use a similar spec-
iﬁcation to investigate the determinants of changes in institutions, but
do so over shorter periods (5 year panels), thereby exploiting time
series variation in the data. In the aid-growth context, Clemens et al.
(2012) primarily rely on a ﬁrst differenced version of (1). The rationale
for ﬁrst differencing is that time invariant country ﬁxed effects, exclud-
ed from theDjankov et al. (2008)model and necessarily absent in cross-
section models, are purged from the data.
The different approaches to estimating Eq. (1), or some transforma-
tion thereof, hold advantages and disadvantages. The very multiplicity
of speciﬁcations and models previously employed in the context of
cross-country time series (panel) data attest to the absence of a single
or predominant ‘best’ methodology. A crucial problem is that ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates tend to be biased when both a lag of
the dependent variable and unit ﬁxed effects are included (Nickell,
1981). This bias is expected to be especially large in short panels
(e.g., T b 10), which are often encountered in cross-country empirical
work.
Alternative estimators or corrections have been proposed to address
dynamic panel bias. Even so, none is universally recommended. For
short panels, a potential response is to exclude either the unit
ﬁxed effects or the lagged dependent variable. Fixed effects may be
adequately captured by a full set of control variables, as well as the ini-
tial observation of the dependent variable. Even so, care must be taken
due to unobserved country heterogeneity. This is relevant here since
country-speciﬁc factors may be correlated with aid inﬂows (among
other things). The endogeneity of aid has been discussed at length else-
where (Arndt et al., 2010); and a popular response is to use instrumen-
tal variables techniques. In an early paper, for example, Knack (2001)
uses infant mortality (in 1980), initial population, initial GDP per capita
and speciﬁc regional dummies as external instruments to identify
the effect of aid on the quality of governance. This strategy echoes
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and has been followed in more recent
studies (e.g., Djankov et al., 2008). In time series panel settings, similar
instrumental variables have been employed (e.g., Wright, 2009), while
other studies have relied on so-called internal instruments of GMM
estimators (Busse and Gröning, 2009; Dutta et al., 2013).6 As Beck and Katz (2011) note, while institutional variables may be highly persistent,
they are not likely to contain a unit root. This is because available institutional measures
are always restricted to a speciﬁc range, implying their variance cannot approach inﬁnity.We recognize that both external and internal instrumental variables
procedures to address the endogeneity of aid are controversial (Bazzi
and Clemens, 2013; Bun and Windmeijer, 2010; Roodman, 2009). For
example, the identifying assumption that income in some previous pe-
riod only affects institutions via aid appears strong. The broader point is
that it may be impossible to ﬁnd highly convincing instruments for
variation in aid ﬂows, especially over short time periods. This concern
lies behind the alternative ﬁrst differencing approach pursued by
Clemens et al. (2012), in which aid enters in lagged form and identiﬁca-
tion comes from variation within countries over time, rather than on
cross-sectional variation between countries.
The merits of omitting a lagged dependent variable largely turn on
the nature of the data generating process, which can be illuminated by
theory. Where the lag is included as an empirical tool to address weak
persistence (auto-correlation) in the error terms, exclusion might be
justiﬁed. In contrast,where theprocess generating thedata is inherently
dynamic –meaning that past realizations of the outcome substantively
determine the marginal effect of other variables – failure to adequately
account for these dynamics is likely to introduce substantial bias. The
discussion of Section 2 suggests that this may be relevant.7 Similarly,
Esarey and DeMeritt (2014) suggest that institutions are likely to exhib-
it some form of state dependence.
A ﬁnal issue is the time interval over which assessment should
take place. Previous studies using cross-sectional estimates have fo-
cussed on the association between long-run changes in institutions
and average aid ﬂows over the same time frame (Arndt, 2015a, Arndt,
2015b; Clemens et al., 2012). Others opt for a time series panel
approach, where variation in institutions is considered over 5 years
(Djankov et al., 2008), 3 years (Busse and Gröning, 2009) or even annu-
ally (Wright, 2009). Theoretically, no speciﬁc time interval is preferred.
Contrary to the aid-growth literature, where aid inputs are likely to
cumulate into aggregate macroeconomic effects over long time frames
(Arndt, 2015a, Arndt, 2015b; Clemens et al., 2012), formal and
visible facets of institutions can change relatively quickly, such as in
rapid democratic transitions. Also, the logic of applying governance con-
ditions to aid ﬂows suggests that donors envisage that institutional
changes occur over relatively short time frames. Nonetheless, we recog-
nize that institutions tend to be persistent over time, there is short run
noise in aid ﬂows, and it is reasonable to expect some lag between aid
delivery and implementation of reforms. This militates against a unique
concern with contemporaneous or purely short-run dynamics.
Pulling these considerations together, we take an agnostic stance
both as to the timing of effects and the appropriate estimation strategy.
To answer our ﬁrst question (the relationship between aid inﬂows and
political institutions over the period 1983–2010), we run both static
cross-section and dynamic panelmodels. The former considers the rela-
tionship between average aid inﬂows and either average institutions or
changes in institutions over the full period. These estimates side-step
the challenge of correctly specifying the dynamic properties of the
data and focus explicitly on between-country variation. Nonetheless,
an exclusion of dynamics runs the risk of misreading causal linkages —
e.g., higher levels of aid may come about in response to improved
institutions. Consequently, we use instrumental variables techniques
to validate our results.
A further shortcoming is that a unique focus on long time frames
may compress (ignore) effective variation in outcomes — i.e., a long
period may contain phases of both improvement and deterioration in
institutions. Put differently, substantial information can be lost by only
taking a static long run view. Thus, we complement a cross-section
approach with dynamic panel estimators, using panels of two, four
and six year durations. In all speciﬁcations we include a lag of the out-
come variable, add a full set of timeﬁxed effects, and lag the aid variable
by one period. The main panel estimators we use are: a random effects7 In addition to including a lag of institutions as a control variable, we also consider het-
erogeneity in responses over initial institutions. This is taken up in Section 6.
9 The synthetic mean is calculated after standardization of the ﬁve respective sub-
measures. It is informative — Cronbach's alpha for the same ﬁve variables takes a value
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RE model includes regional dummy variables and treats the unit ﬁxed
effects as uncorrelated with other regressors. Although this model is
often taken to be inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent
variable, Ashley (2010) shows that this conclusion is not correct if
the other regressors are exogenous. The BCFE model uses the simple
asymptotic approximation suggested by Bun and Carree (2005), based
on a ﬁrst stage ﬁxed effects dynamic panel model.
The system GMM estimates use ﬁrst differencing to remove the unit
effects. In addition, the aid terms are explicitly treated as endogenous,
meaning that internal instrumental variables are used for identiﬁcation.
So, these estimates provide a further guard against endogeneity con-
cerns. To avoid over-ﬁtting, we restrict the number of lags used as inter-
nal instruments to two (see Roodman, 2009). Also, following theMonte
Carlo evidence of Soto (2009), we rely on the conservative one-step es-
timator and report robust standard errors. As recommended elsewhere
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008; McKinnish, 2008; Sen et al., 2007), the use
of alternative estimators and time periods helps validate whether our
results are robust to alternative methodological choices and identifying
assumptions.
4. Data
4.1. Metrics of institutions
Alongside such notions as ‘government quality’ or ‘governance’, the
term ‘institutions’ is often used to refer to a range of facets. These in-
clude political accountability, the rule of law, government effectiveness
and perceptions of corruption.While all these facets essentially speak to
the extent to which public authority is exercised impartially (Rothstein
and Teorell, 2008), no single metric of impartiality can be deemed
unproblematic. We do not seek to resolve this issue here. Rather, we
simply note that a useful distinction between different indices is
whether they refer primarily to institutional inputs or rules of the
game (e.g., democracy, rule of law), versus institutional outputs such
as bureaucratic efﬁciency, regulatory capacity and corruption. Data on
these latter aspects (outputs) tends to be patchy across developing
countries and is often only available in recent years. In contrast, data
on inputs is more comprehensive — e.g., as per the Polity IV dataset
(see below). For this practical reason we focus on such measures,
which we refer to as metrics of political institutions. Nonetheless, we
take comfort from other analysts who note a correlation across many
different facets of government quality (Holmberg et al., 2009).
To measure political institutions we use ﬁve alternative indexes.
These are all taken from the Quality of Government (QoG) database,
which is a repository of metrics collated from multiple sources
(Teorell et al., 2013). We use a range of measures not only to verify
the consistency of our results, but also to examine whether speciﬁc
aspects of institutions are more (less) responsive to foreign aid, which
may be pertinent where donors pay attention to speciﬁc institutional
outcomes. To minimize correlation between the ﬁve measures, as well
as possible sample selection bias, each is taken from a separate external
source (included in the QoG database). The chosen measures are:
(i) democracy; (ii) the number of veto players over political decisions
(denoted ‘checks’); (iii) executive constraints; (iv) political terror; and
(v) judicial independence. Appendix A provides a more detailed over-
viewof these indicators, their respective rawscales and original sources.
Throughout, positive values indicate ‘better’ outcomes, meaning that
the raw political terror measure has been reversed.8
All of the chosen metrics have featured in previous studies, though
rarely in conjunction. The ﬁrst two measures are the main focus
of Djankov et al. (2008). Both executive constraints and judicial8 With the exception of the correlation between democracy and executive constraints
(equal to 0.90), pairwise correlations between the remaining chosenmeasures range from
0.06 to 0.58 (on an annual basis).independence (the rule of law) have been considered vital to the stabil-
ity of nascent democracies (Kapstein and Converse, 2008; Savun and
Tirone, 2011). Moreover, they are often a particular focus of donor
funding (Tiede, 2006). The absence of political terror reﬂects the degree
of protection of human rights and is another domain that has often con-
cerned donors, partly for domestic legal reasons (Forsythe, 1987).
Appendix Table B1(a) reports raw averages for these measures by
geographic region. The table also reports their synthetic mean, which
is used as an overall measure of institutions in our analysis. To assist in-
terpretation and to exclude the effect of different underlying scales, all
outcome measures are entered in the regression analysis in standard-
ized form, taking a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 100.9
Consequently, estimated regression coefﬁcients represent percentages
of a standard deviation. Appendix Fig. B1 illustrates the uneven and
varied behavior of the synthetic average metric of institutions, and its
component sub-measures, for the South Asia region and sub-Saharan
Africa.
The period covered by the analysis is 1983–2010. The termination
date is the latest available in the aid database (see below). Earlier
years are excluded for two reasons. First, the quality and coverage of
information on both institutions and aid values are increasingly patchy
as one reaches further back in time. Second, we must be sensitive to
changes in donor behavior over time. Fleck and Kilby (2010), among
others, document that the end of the Cold War and the beginning of
the War on Terror were associated with important shifts in aid alloca-
tions and interests. Studies that focus predominantly on the period
before the 1990s may largely capture Cold War aid dynamics, which
offer a poor guide to events of the last two decades. In contrast, the
period 1983–2010 can be seen as containing a reasonable balance
between ‘older’ and ‘newer’ aid regimes.4.2. Explanatory variables
Data on foreign aid is taken from the current (static) research release
of the AidData database (version 2.1; see Tierney et al., 2011).10
Compared to the standard OECD-DAC creditor reporting system (CRS),
which is integrated into the AidData records, the latter has the advan-
tage of providing a more comprehensive view of aid across all types of
donors over time, including project-speciﬁc information from multilat-
eral organizations and information from non-DAC members. A main
reason for using this data is that allocation of aid by purpose is coded
in a consistent format, allowing a more disaggregated analysis to take
place.
The deﬁnition of aid used here is commitments of Ofﬁcial Develop-
ment Assistance loans and grants from all donors, includingmultilateral
agencies. This excludes all non-concessional funding, loan guarantees
and any equity participations. We use data on aid commitments be-
cause, historically, purpose-related information on aid has only been
available for commitments, not actual disbursements.While this consti-
tutes a limitation, commitments provide a signal to recipients regarding
the primary interests and intentions of donors. To the extent that aid
funding comes with attached conditions, such commitments thus may
map more consistently to changes in recipient behavior than (lumpy)
disbursements. In any case, to address possible bias from any systematic
discrepancies between commitments and disbursements, our estimates
include recipient and period ﬁxed effects (see Eq. (1)). Also, we use
averages of data over multiple years, which should reduce stochastic
discrepancies between commitments and disbursements.of 0.77, which implies a relatively high degree of internal consistency across themeasures.
Also, the correlation coefﬁcient between the mean and the score generated from the ﬁrst
principal components of the same variables is equal to 0.99.
10 See the AidData website: http://aiddata.org.
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recipient in each period into three broad categories: ‘governance’,
‘economic’ and ‘other’ aid.11 The former captures aid for (inter alia) the
strengtheningof government policies andplans, public sector and civil so-
ciety institutional development, as well as human rights and conﬂict pre-
vention activities. These ﬂows are expected to be most closely associated
with institutional performance requirements or reﬂect greater attention
by donors to governance outcomes (see Section 2). Economic aid primar-
ily encompasses support to production sectors, including support to the
private sector (e.g., banking sector), agriculture, industry and infrastruc-
ture, as well as trade-related activities. Outcomes in these domains typi-
cally are hard to verify and, arguably, provide greater scope for misuse
of funds — e.g., to buttress the interests of political leaders. Other aid is
the remainder, which predominantly consists of social sector funding, hu-
manitarian relief and debt-related actions.
Appendix C gives full details of the aid classiﬁcation used.12 All aid
values are expressed as a share of GDP in constant international dollars
(as per Djankov et al. 2008). Panel (b) of Table B1 summarizes average
values of each type of aid (as a share of GDP) for each region; and panel
(c) shows the composition of total aid in percent. The latter indicates
that governance aid has frequently been the smallest component of aid
(around 10%, on average), while the remainder category (other) has con-
sistently been the largest. Bilateral aid constitutes themajority of aid in all
regions.
As noted in Section 2, a relevant aspect of aid effectiveness concerns
its volatility. To categorize aid according to its (perceived) permanence,
one might also rely on the stated objectives of aid (e.g., emergency aid
versus capital investment). This is not straightforward, however, since
project life-cycles can differ considerably evenwithin economic sectors.
Consequently, we adopt a data-driven approach. Speciﬁcally, we apply
the lag operator frequency decomposition to distinguish between aid
commitments at lower and higher frequencies (i.e., stable versus more
volatile). This is given by:
Aidt ¼ 0:5 Aidt − Aidt−1ð Þ þ 0:5 Aidt þ Aidt−1ð Þ ð2Þ
The ﬁrst difference component capturesmovements in aid occurring
at a relatively high frequency. The second component is the lower
frequency or moving average component. In the case of panel data
collapsed into (say) six year periods, the second term would represent
average aid inﬂows over a full 12 years. This decomposition has been
applied in different contexts and appears to perform well relative to
other, more elaborate time series ﬁlters (see Baker et al., 1999; Gray
and Qiu, 2010). Moreover, it provides a bridge between static or
longer-run estimates and those that focus on shorter-run dynamics.
The remaining control variables used in the model are similar
to those used in previous studies. They include GDP per capita (log.),
population size (log.), life expectancy, the share of trade in GDP (a
proxy for openness), the share of population resident in urban areas,
and a dummy variable indicating whether the recipient is a net oil or
gas exporter (capturing possible resource curse effects).
5. Results
We present our results in sequence. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 address our
ﬁrst question and focus on the relationship between total aid commit-
ments and the synthetic measure of institutions, using both static and
dynamic panel models. In Section 5.3 we rely primarily on the dynamic
panel estimators and disaggregate aid according to its frequency do-
main and stated objectives. Section 6 separately explores the robustness
of our ﬁndings to sub-measures of institutions, as well as potential11 Zero-valued aid observations are treated as zeroes, rather thanmissing (for discussion
see Arndt et al., 2010). Countries are excluded from the analysis only if they receive no aid,
as deﬁned above, over the entire period.
12 Note that AidData purpose codes and OECD-DAC CRS codes are complementary.heterogeneity in the results. This section also explores whether the
results are driven by latent trends in institutional development, which
would be a form of omitted variables bias.
5.1. Cross-section estimates
Table 1 reports selected coefﬁcients from our main cross-section re-
sults, covering 104 countries. All models include regional dummies and
control for the number of years for whichwe have valid observations in
each country. Columns (I) is the between regression corresponding to
Eq. (1), in which all variables represent the full period averages for
each country. Column (II) retains the same RHS speciﬁcation but
replaces the outcome variable with the mean for the most recent
six year period (2005–2010). Column (III) essentially replicates the
speciﬁcation of Knack (2004), which involves subtracting the initial
observation for the outcome from both sides of the speciﬁcation used
in column (II). The initial observation is deﬁned as the mean for the
ﬁrst six years in the data; thus, the dependent variable is the long differ-
ence (change). Column (IV) repeats column (III) but replaces all control
variables excluding Aid/GDP with their most recent observations (six
year means). Finally, columns (V) and (VI) represent a long difference
speciﬁcation in which all variables are speciﬁed as the difference
between the last and ﬁrst period means.
Identiﬁcation in thesemodels is taken from variation between coun-
tries. The estimated coefﬁcients on Aid/GDP, which aremarginal effects,
indicate whether these ﬂows provide additional (predictive) informa-
tion about the expected value of the outcome variable, after controlling
for observed country characteristics. All speciﬁcations inwhichAid/GDP
enters in mean form indicate a moderate and statistically signiﬁcant
association (columns I to IV). These estimates also are highly similar
in magnitude, ranging from around 3.3 to 6.8. Column (III) is equivalent
to the speciﬁcation of column (II) with a lagged dependent variable
added. Changes in the coefﬁcients here thus reﬂect the inclusion
of this lag, which enters without restriction. Indeed, the estimated coef-
ﬁcient on this term is signiﬁcantly different fromminus one, suggesting
that column (II) may bemisspeciﬁed. This supports our hypothesis that
institutional development displays some state dependence. Column
(IV) represents a more conservative speciﬁcation than column (III)
since it controls for all contemporaneous associations between the out-
come and the additional explanatory variable, such as per capita in-
come. Put differently, it controls for any indirect pathways connecting
aid to institutional changes via these variables. As expected, the coefﬁ-
cient on mean Aid/GDP declines relative to that of column (III).13
Two other ﬁndings are noteworthy. First, the long difference results
(columns V and VI) are least similar to those of the other models.
The point to note here, however, is the substantial reduction in the
R-squared metric (increase in the RMSE) relative to the speciﬁcations in
columns (III) and (IV). This indicates a loss of information in the former
models, reﬂecting the fact that data is only taken from the ﬁrst and last
periods. Second, the direction and magnitude of the control variables
are broadly consistent across models (especially columns I to IV). As
expected, countries with higher incomes tend to have better political
institutions. However, consistent with the resource curse literature
(Altincekic and Bearce, 2014; McGuirk, 2013), oil and gas exporters
show signiﬁcantly lower quality political institutions ceteris paribus.
The previous estimates do not correct for the potential endogeneity
of aid. Reverse causality could be present if institutional improvements
achieved in earlier years are rewarded by higher aid in later years (and
thus a larger mean value of aid). To address this concern, we follow the
procedures employed by Kersting and Kilby (2014); also Knack (2004).
Table 2 reports our results, in which the speciﬁcation of Table 1 column
III is used as a reference (reported again in column I) and only adjust-
ments for the Aid/GDP term are implemented. Speciﬁcally, in column13 The alternative is to use initial observations for the controls, which represents a re-
duced form. This yields a larger coefﬁcient on mean Aid/GDP. Details available on request.
Table 1
Cross-section regressions for aggregate aid (1983–2010).
Mean levels Difference levels Long differences
I II III IV V VI
Aid/GDP 3.33⁎⁎ 6.85⁎⁎⁎ 6.54⁎⁎⁎ 6.07⁎⁎⁎ 0.76 0.87
(1.58) (2.14) (1.81) (1.67) (0.94) (0.96)
GDP p.c. (log.) 53.93⁎⁎⁎ 65.88⁎⁎⁎ 46.94⁎⁎⁎ 38.37⁎⁎ −10.24 −8.14
(13.97) (16.66) (15.76) (14.76) (35.21) (34.78)
Total trade (% GDP) −0.05 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.75⁎ 0.84⁎
(0.24) (0.28) (0.26) (0.23) (0.40) (0.42)
Life expectancy 2.59⁎ 1.45 0.60 0.20 1.17 1.38
(1.46) (1.78) (1.67) (1.47) (1.79) (1.85)
Urbanization −0.24 −0.51 −0.31 0.03 1.13 1.10
(0.51) (0.60) (0.60) (0.55) (1.35) (1.38)
Oil/gas exporter −61.63⁎⁎⁎ −79.41⁎⁎⁎ −71.30⁎⁎⁎ −66.24⁎⁎⁎ −52.35⁎ −46.64
(17.60) (19.05) (18.09) (16.23) (31.14) (30.20)
Institutions (initial) – – −0.67⁎⁎⁎ −0.66⁎⁎⁎ – 0.13
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Outcome spec. Mean Last Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff.
Aid spec. Mean Mean Mean Mean Diff. Diff.
Control specs. Mean Mean Mean Last Diff. Diff.
Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104
R2 (adjusted) 0.50 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.01 0.01
RMSE 58.05 67.63 63.56 64.30 82.87 82.82
Notes: dependent variable is the synthetic metric of institutions; second panel indicates the speciﬁcation of the outcome, aid and control variables — ‘Mean’ indicates the long run (full
period) mean, ‘Last’ indicates the most recent 6-year period mean, ‘Diff.’ is the difference between the last and ﬁrst (initial) 6-year period means; all models include a full set of regional
ﬁxed effects; selected coefﬁcients shown; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust.
Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.
⁎ 0.1.
⁎⁎ 0.05.
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recipient was ever a colony, as well as the initial period observations for
life expectancy and log. population. As an alternative, in column (III) we
use an alternative instrument set, which includes the same colony
dummy plus additional dummy variables for the corresponding colonialTable 2
Difference level regressions for aggregate aid, with external instruments (1983–2010).
I II
Aid/GDP 6.54⁎⁎⁎ 11.03⁎ 6
(1.81) (6.11) (
GDP p.c. (log.) 46.94⁎⁎⁎ 65.06⁎⁎ 47
(15.76) (26.23) (
Total trade (% GDP) 0.17 0.24
(0.26) (0.26) (
Life expectancy 0.60 1.13
(1.67) (1.73) (
Urbanization −0.31 −0.49 −
(0.60) (0.60) (
Oil/gas exporter −71.30⁎⁎⁎ −68.70⁎⁎⁎ −7
(18.09) (17.04) (1
Institutions (initial) −0.67⁎⁎⁎ −0.68⁎⁎⁎ −
(0.11) (0.10) (
Aid spec. Mean Mean-IV M
Instrument set – A
Obs. 104 104
R2 (adjusted) 0.42 0.38
RMSE 63.56 60.23 5
Endogeneity (prob.) – 0.40
Under-id. (prob.) – 0.05
Hansen J (prob.) – 0.48
Notes: dependent variable is the difference of the syntheticmetric of institutions between the la
the speciﬁcation of Aid/GDP — ‘Mean’ indicates the long run (full period) mean, ‘First’ indic
instrumented; instrument set A is a dummy for whether the country was ever colonized, initi
whether the country was ever colonized and dummies for the corresponding colonial power (
for the endogeneity of Aid/GDP, instrument relevance and validity (see text); IV estimates use th
shown; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust.
Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.
⁎ 0.1.
⁎⁎ 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ 0.01.power (Britain, Spain, France, Portugal). Lastly, to avert reverse
causality, we restrict the (endogenous) Aid/GDP variable to the mean
from the ﬁrst period only. Using this deﬁnition of aid we run the same
estimates, with and without instrumental variables (IVs); these are
found in columns (IV)–(VI).III IV V VI
.56⁎⁎ 4.19⁎⁎ 14.13 5.07⁎⁎
3.17) (1.72) (10.82) (2.47)
.04⁎⁎⁎ 31.52⁎⁎ 57.47⁎ 33.84⁎⁎
17.58) (15.58) (33.70) (16.16)
0.17 0.12 0.21 0.13
0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.23)
0.61 −0.13 −0.05 −0.12
1.62) (1.52) (1.64) (1.37)
0.31 −0.05 −0.08 −0.05
0.56) (0.62) (0.71) (0.58)
1.28⁎⁎⁎ −72.17⁎⁎⁎ −65.24⁎⁎⁎ −71.55⁎⁎⁎
6.69) (18.30) (19.20) (16.68)
0.67⁎⁎⁎ −0.69⁎⁎⁎ −0.75⁎⁎⁎ −0.69⁎⁎⁎
0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11)
ean-IV First First-IV First-IV
B – A B
104 104 104 104
0.42 0.38 0.17 0.38
8.47 65.61 69.79 60.43
0.86 – 0.15 0.51
0.08 – 0.15 0.39
0.70 – 0.56 0.41
st and ﬁrst 6-year periods; column I replicates column III of Table 1; second panel indicates
ates the initial 6-year mean (1983–1988), sufﬁx ‘IV’ means that the variable has been
al period life expectancy and initial log, population size; instrument set B is a dummy for
Britain, France, Spain, Portugal); the ﬁnal panel reports probabilities associated with tests
e LIML estimator; all models include a full set of regional ﬁxed effects; selected coefﬁcients
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Aid/GDP remain in the positive domain and four of the ﬁve new esti-
mates are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level (or below). The estimated
effect of aid on institutional development is of a broadly similar
magnitude to earlier results; however, as is often the case when using
instrumental variables, the precision of estimates for the endogenous
explanatory variable is lower. The broad similarity of these results
reﬂects, in part, the auxiliary ﬁnding that concerns regarding the
endogeneity of aid appear insubstantial, after inclusion of other covari-
ates. As shown in theﬁnal panel of the table, tests for the endogeneity of
the aid term fail to reject the null hypothesis that aid can be treated as
exogenous. We also note that the instrument sets perform reasonably.
In all cases Hansen J tests for instrument validity cannot be rejected.
However, tests for under-identiﬁcation using the Kleibergen–Paap
statistic suggest that the instruments are weak, especially in the case
where aid is deﬁned as the ﬁrst period mean only.145.2. Dynamic panel estimates
The dynamic panel estimates extend the model in column (IV) of
Table 1 to a panel data context. Rather than considering differences be-
tween the ﬁrst and last periods, we now consider adjacent periods.
Summary results for a range of estimators are reported in Table 3,
which focuses on panels of four years,meaning that the data is collapsed
into a maximum of seven observations per country. Again, to avert re-
verse causality, Aid/GDP is lagged one panel period but all other control
variables are contemporaneous, which represents a conservative speci-
ﬁcation. For practical purposes, we do not specify the dependent vari-
able in difference terms; however, as per the equivalence between
autoregressive distributed lag and error correction models, results are
identical (e.g., De Boef and Keele, 2008).
Columns (I) to (III) impose restrictions on the unit ﬁxed effects
terms of Eq. (1), taking identiﬁcation from both the time and cross-
section components. The OLS model (column I) is a simple pooled
panel estimator. As the data is strongly balanced, this yields equivalent
coefﬁcient estimates to that of the RE model (column II). Columns (IV)
to (VI) address the role of unit ﬁxed effects using either a within-
transformation (FE) or ﬁrst differencing (GMM) procedure. In turn,
identiﬁcation is only taken from variation within countries over time.
Regardless of the estimator, we ﬁnd highly consistent results for the
lagged Aid/GDP marginal effect. These indicate that a one percentage
point increase in the share of Aid/GDP in the previous (four year) period
is associated with an increase in political institutional quality of
around two percent of a standard deviation in the present period.
The long-runmultiplier associated with these same estimates is reported
in the footer. This takes into account the persistent nature of the outcome:
LRM ¼ β^ = ð1 − ρ^Þ and approximates the cumulative expected
impact (over the long run) of a change in Aid/GDP. The magnitude of
these LRM estimates is consistent with the direct long run estimates of
Table 1, ranging between around 5 and 8 (ignoring the FE estimates).
Results for other variables are also broadly consistent across the dif-
ferent estimators. In keeping with theory, the ﬁxed effects estimator
(column IV) yields a downwards biased coefﬁcient estimate for the
lagged dependent variable. Nonetheless, consistent with Monte Carlo
evidence (e.g., Bun and Carree, 2005), estimates for all other coefﬁcients
appear less severely affected. The simple bias correction (column
V) seems adequate and yields highly similar but somewhat less precise
coefﬁcient estimates.15 Indeed, a Hausman test of the RE and BCFE14 Our IV estimates use the LIML estimator and are implemented in Stata via the ivreg2
user-written command. Further details on the accompanying tests can be found in Baum
et al. (2003).
15 To implement the BCFE we use the estimates in column (IV) to calculate a corrected
coefﬁcient for the lagged dependent variable. This is given by: ρ^BC ¼ ½1þ T þ ρ^ FEðT2 þ TÞ
ðT2−T þ 1Þ−1. Next, the same FEmodel is run, now restricting the relevant coefﬁcient to
its corrected value. Standard errors on this term are estimated via a bootstrap procedure.estimates indicates that there are no systematic differences between
the two sets of results (overall). Lastly, as noted in Section 3, the system
GMM results provide an additional safeguard against endogeneity
concerns. These results are even less precise, but provide no grounds
to question the estimates from alternative approaches. In sum, the
dynamic panel estimates conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the previous section.
5.3. Disaggregating aid
Turning to our second question,we considerwhether the estimates of
themarginal effect of aid on the syntheticmeasure of political institutions
depend on the type of aid inﬂow. In light of the consistency between the
dynamic panel and long run cross-section estimates, aswell as the specif-
ic relevance of a dynamic speciﬁcation to distinguish between transitory
andmore permanent ﬂows, we rely on the former. Speciﬁcally, we report
results for the RE, BCFE andGMMestimators and consider panels of vary-
ing lengths.16 Panel (1) of Table 4 replicates theprevious results for aggre-
gate aid (lagged), covering panels of different lengths. For brevity, only
estimated coefﬁcients on the relevant Aid/GDP terms are reported.17
Panel (2) replaces the total Aid/GDP termwith the low and high frequen-
cy components (entered together). These are derived as per Eq. (2) and
are denoted LR and SR (long run, short run). As before, in order to reduce
potential reverse causality, we continue to include aid on a lagged basis.
As such, the SR component captures the (ﬁrst) difference in aid commit-
ments between periods t − 1 and t − 2; and the LR component cap-
tures average Aid/GDP over both periods.
Two results stand out from panels (1) and (2). First, the ﬁnding of a
small positive effect running from aggregate aid to political institutions
is supported across panels of different durations. These estimates also
are statistically signiﬁcant in most cases. The absolute values of the
coefﬁcients in Aid/GDP (panel 1) vary across panel lengths, reﬂecting im-
plicit differences in dynamics. Critically, the corresponding LRMs are lo-
cated in a similar range to previous estimates. For instance, the LRMs for
the RE estimates equal 5.8 and 8.0 over two and six year panels respec-
tively. Second, the results of panel (2) indicate this is driven by the low
frequency (more permanent) component of aid. Coefﬁcient estimates
on the LR term are generally larger than for aggregate aid; in turn, they
point to moderately higher LRMs associated with this component of aid.
Panels (3) and (4) take into account differing objectives of aid.
Panel (3) applies the three-way classiﬁcation of total aid described in
Section 4. Panel (4) further decomposes governance aid into lower and
higher frequency components. This represents themost extensive disag-
gregation of aid we consider here.18 The main result from these speciﬁ-
cations is that longer-term ﬂows of governance aid (normalized by
GDP) display a highly robust and consistent positive associationwith po-
litical institutions. Compared to the relatively small magnitude of the
marginal effects (and LRMs) associated with aggregate aid, the marginal
effects (LRMs) associated with governance aid are much more substan-
tial. Taking the RE estimates, the LRMs on the low frequency component
of governance aid range from 20–50% of a standard deviation (depend-
ing on the panel length), which is more than four times the estimates
in panel (1). An effect of this magnitude is supported by long run
cross-section estimates on the form of Table 1, using the disaggregated
measures of aid (see Appendix Table B2, columns I–IV).
In addition to these core ﬁndings, Table 4 hints at additional patterns
in the data. These are less robust to the choice of panel length or estima-
tor, but merit note. First, the marginal effect associated with economic
aid is often negative and is signiﬁcantly less than zero in some models.
Moreover, the LRMs calculated from these terms are larger in16 All speciﬁcations include the same control variables as before (e.g., Table 3), plus a full
set of time effects.
17 Full estimates are available on request.
18 Both economic and other aid can be decomposed into low and high frequency compo-
nents. We do not do so here just for clarity of exposition.
Table 3
Alternative dynamic panel estimates for aggregate aid (4 year panels).
OLS RE MLE FE BCFE GMM
I II III IV V VI
Institutions (lag) 0.78⁎⁎⁎ 0.78⁎⁎⁎ 0.75⁎⁎⁎ 0.45⁎⁎⁎ 0.77⁎⁎⁎ 0.74⁎⁎⁎
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Aid/GDP (lag) 1.71⁎⁎⁎ 1.71⁎⁎⁎ 1.70⁎⁎⁎ 1.52⁎⁎⁎ 1.29⁎⁎ 2.18⁎⁎⁎
(0.34) (0.34) (0.39) (0.37) (0.49) (0.62)
GDP p.c. (log.) 7.85 7.85 8.45 5.50 −1.80 −12.27
(4.22) (4.22) (4.55) (13.91) (15.29) (9.73)
Total trade (% GDP) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.22 0.56⁎⁎⁎
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12)
Life expectancy 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.32 0.58 1.17
(0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (1.07) (1.08) (0.76)
Urbanization 0.19 0.19 0.21 1.42 1.60 0.91
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.87) (0.94) (0.53)
Oil/gas exporter −18.87⁎⁎⁎ −18.87⁎⁎⁎ −19.94⁎⁎⁎ −3.88 −4.90 −23.02⁎
(4.74) (4.74) (5.22) (9.57) (13.02) (10.84)
N 587 587 587 587 587 587
RMSE 43.42 43.42 42.75 35.59 42.28 48.51
LRM 7.80 7.80 6.92 2.77 5.65 8.28
Notes: dependent variable is the synthetic metric of institutions; speciﬁcation follows Eq. (1); column headers indicate estimator — OLS is pooled ordinary least squares, RE is panel
random effects, MLE is a maximum likelihood random effects estimator, FE is panel ﬁxed effects, BCFE applies an asymptotic bias correction to the former model, GMM is Blundell–
Bond system GMM; all models include a full set of panel (time) effects; columns I–III include regional ﬁxed effects; only selected coefﬁcients shown; standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the recipient level; LRM is a long run multiplier estimated from estimates in the ﬁrst two rows (see text).
Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.
⁎ 0.1.
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Secondly, ‘other aid’ appears to hold a small positive association
with political institutions, especially when viewed over longer time
periods. There are two main candidate explanations for this ﬁnding.
On the onehand, itmay reﬂect spillovers fromaid-ﬁnanced expenditure
in social sectors, such as on training and education. On the other hand,
it may be capturing the contribution of multi-sector programmes
(such as budget support), which fall into this category (see Appendix
C) but are often associated with explicit governance performance
conditions.Table 4
Estimates for alternative types of aid.
2 year panels
RE BCFE GMM
(1) Aid/GDP 0.84⁎⁎⁎ 0.62⁎⁎⁎ 0.50 1.
(0.18) (0.22) (0.31) (0
(2) Aid/GDP (LR) 0.94⁎⁎⁎ 0.70⁎⁎ 0.26 1.
(0.23) (0.29) (0.33) (0
Aid/GDP (SR) 0.26 0.18 −0.42 1
(0.49) (0.54) (0.81) (0
(3) Govern. aid/GDP 2.88⁎⁎⁎ 2.99⁎⁎⁎ 2.90⁎⁎⁎ 7.
(0.64) (0.81) (0.83) (1
Economic aid/GDP −0.81 −1.95⁎⁎⁎ −1.29 0
(0.54) (0.64) (1.42) (1
Other aid/GDP 0.84⁎⁎⁎ 0.72⁎⁎ 0.65 1
(0.26) (0.28) (0.48) (0
(4) Govern. aid/GDP (LR) 2.83⁎⁎⁎ 2.94⁎⁎ 2.72⁎⁎ 11
(1.04) (1.20) (1.12) (3
Govern. aid/GDP (SR) 3.25 2.65 3.72 2
(2.82) (2.71) (3.35) (3
Economic aid/GDP −1.03⁎ −2.56⁎⁎⁎ −1.45 0
(0.58) (0.67) (1.48) (1
Other aid/GDP 0.78⁎⁎⁎ 0.68⁎⁎ 0.32 0
(0.25) (0.29) (0.44) (0
Notes: dependent variable is the syntheticmetric of institutions; separate regressionmodels are
of estimator (see Table 3) and panel period length applied; speciﬁcation follows Eq. (1), with a
clude regionalﬁxed effects; only coefﬁcients on aid terms shown; aggregate aid terms are lagged
standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the recipient level.
Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.
⁎ 0.1.
⁎⁎ 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ 0.01.6. Robustness
6.1. Sub-measures of institutions
The previous section relied on the synthetic (mean) measure of polit-
ical institutions. This begs the question whether the positive association
between aid, and speciﬁc types of aid, holds over the constituent sub-
measures. This question is investigated in Table 5, which separately
runs the same models reported in panels (1) to (3) of Table 5 for each
of the ﬁve sub-measures. A main ﬁnding is that there is a generally4 year panels 6 year panels
RE BCFE GMM RE BCFE GMM
71⁎⁎⁎ 1.29⁎⁎⁎ 2.18⁎⁎⁎ 2.67⁎⁎⁎ 2.26⁎⁎⁎ 1.87⁎⁎
.34) (0.49) (0.62) (0.53) (0.74) (0.94)
80⁎⁎⁎ 1.48 1.31 2.67⁎⁎⁎ 1.05 3.12⁎
.44) (0.93) (0.99) (0.71) (1.98) (1.70)
.34 0.47 1.76 3.87⁎⁎⁎ 2.84⁎⁎⁎ 1.78
.94) (0.92) (1.26) (1.02) (0.97) (2.22)
44⁎⁎⁎ 7.32⁎⁎⁎ 7.12⁎⁎⁎ 12.09⁎⁎⁎ 11.54⁎⁎⁎ 14.04⁎⁎⁎
.47) (1.89) (2.71) (2.29) (2.91) (5.00)
.17 −2.09 2.85 0.99 −0.37 −2.55
.24) (1.73) (2.80) (1.90) (3.23) (3.50)
.07⁎ 0.64 0.97 1.45⁎ 0.89 1.23
.59) (0.77) (1.10) (0.83) (1.11) (1.74)
.82⁎⁎⁎ 13.10⁎⁎⁎ 10.33⁎⁎ 14.51⁎⁎ 9.07 6.59
.31) (4.98) (4.59) (6.38) (7.97) (9.08)
.44 0.95 2.36 10.85 12.04 20.50⁎
.51) (4.60) (5.20) (7.34) (8.38) (10.77)
.23 −2.73 1.61 0.51 −0.84 −2.42
.37) (1.86) (3.18) (2.16) (3.66) (4.83)
.72 −0.01 0.43 1.49⁎ 0.35 0.64
.62) (0.89) (1.13) (0.88) (1.44) (2.32)
indicated by rownumbers (1–4) and column headings; columns indicate the combination
ggregate aid replaced by disaggregate components in row models (2)–(4); RE models in-
one period; LR and SR indicate permanent and transitory components of aid (see Eq. (2));
274 S. Jones, F. Tarp / Journal of Development Economics 118 (2016) 266–281consistent positive relationship between low frequency ﬂows of aggre-
gate aid and each sub-measure. That is, our earlier ﬁndings do not appear
to be driven by a single sub-measure. At the same time, the relationship
between governance aid and political institutions appears most robust
for the ‘checks’ and ‘political terror’ metrics. In contrast the same results
(panel 3) are least robust for executive constraints, judicial independence
and democracy. We do not wish to interpret these ﬁndings beyond the
scope of the analysis. While this may be capturing important nuances in
how aid may affect institutional development, it may also reﬂect differ-
ences in data quality and/or in the granularity of the underlying institu-
tional measures. Indeed, it is notable that the scales of executive
constraints and judicial independence are the narrowest of the chosen
sub-measures.
6.2. Heterogeneity
The discussion in Section 2 suggested that the effect of aid on institu-
tions may vary across different contexts. This view ﬁnds support in pre-
vious empirical studies. These point to variation in aid effectiveness
driven by existing institutional conditions (Wright, 2009), the geopolit-
ical considerations of donors (Dunning, 2004; Fleck and Kilby, 2010;
Jones, 2015) and membership of a speciﬁc geographic region
(e.g., neighborhood spillover effects). A simple means to investigate
the relevance of these factors is to interact them with aid. Focusing on
aggregate aid (for simplicity), Appendix Table B3 reports summary re-
sults from separate dynamic panel models incorporating different
interaction terms. The interactions with Aid/GDP (lagged) included in
each panel refer to: (1) a set of regional dummy variables; (2) log.
GDP per capita; (3) the initial (earliest) observation of the outcomeTable 5
Dynamic panel results for sub-measures of institutions.
Outcome Model/covariate 2 y
RE
Checks (1) Aid/GDP 0.94⁎⁎⁎
(2) Aid/GDP (LR) 1.20⁎⁎⁎
Aid/GDP (SR) −0.13 −
(3) Govern. aid/GDP 6.02⁎⁎⁎
Economic aid/GDP −1.26 −
Other aid/GDP 0.48
Political terror (−) (1) Aid/GDP 0.55⁎⁎
(2) Aid/GDP (LR) 0.54⁎
Aid/GDP (SR) 0.60
(3) Govern. aid/GDP 1.65⁎⁎⁎
Economic aid/GDP 0.13 −
Other aid/GDP 0.44
Exec. constraints (1) Aid/GDP 0.78⁎⁎⁎
(2) Aid/GDP (LR) 0.81⁎⁎⁎
Aid/GDP (SR) 0.51
(3) Govern. aid/GDP 1.64
Economic aid/GDP 0.04 −
Other aid/GDP 0.78⁎⁎
Democracy (1) Aid/GDP 0.50⁎⁎⁎
(2) Aid/GDP (LR) 0.45⁎⁎
Aid/GDP (SR) 0.46
(3) Govern. aid/GDP 0.51
Economic aid/GDP −0.59 −
Other aid/GDP 0.75⁎⁎⁎
Judicial indep. (1) Aid/GDP 0.50⁎⁎
(2) Aid/GDP (LR) 0.75⁎⁎⁎
Aid/GDP (SR) −0.40 −
(3) Govern. aid/GDP 1.54⁎
Economic aid/GDP −0.15 −
Other aid/GDP 0.45
Notes: dependent variable is indicated in column ‘Outcome’; regression models (1–3) follow
applied; only coefﬁcients on aid terms shown; aggregate aid terms are lagged one period; LR a
(in parentheses) are clustered at the recipient level.
Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.
⁎ 0.1.
⁎⁎ 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ 0.01.variable; and a dummy variable for the post-Cold War period (deﬁned
as 1993 onwards).
Results from this exercise are not precise, but they do suggest that
some response heterogeneity is present. In particular, the response of
institutions to aid seems to be more stronger where initial institutions
are better. Also, we note that a positive relation between Aid/GDP and
political institutions appears more robust since the mid-1990s. This
accords with the ﬁndings of Dunning (2004) and helps account for the
distinctive nature of the present results relative to previous studies,
which place greater reliance on data from earlier periods.
6.3. Latent trends
An outstanding concern with our empirical strategy is that the results
may reﬂect a latent or pre-existing trend through which institutional de-
velopments and aid commitments are spuriously correlated. While we
have attempted to address this – e.g., by including a lag of the outcome
variable, specifying aid with a one period lag, using the system GMM es-
timator, and by using different temporal data structures – these methods
may not be foolproof. For example, a spurious correlation may remain if
donors have private knowledge that enables them to correctly forecast
the evolution of political institutions and they allocate aid accordingly. A
means to ascertain whether this is driving our results is to include addi-
tional controls for temporal trends in the outcome variable (for a similar
procedure see Guriev et al. 2011). These can be estimated from past and
future observations at different levels of aggregation.
We use annual data to separately estimate linear and quadratic
time trends, at both the country- and regional-levels, for each outcome
variable (i.e., the synthetic mean and its sub-measures). These areear panels 4 year panels
BCFE GMM RE BCFE GMM
0.55⁎ 0.53 2.14⁎⁎⁎ 2.45⁎⁎⁎ 2.36⁎⁎⁎
1.11⁎⁎⁎ 0.72 1.88⁎⁎⁎ 4.12⁎⁎ 1.93⁎
0.22 −1.50 2.66⁎ 1.37 1.96
4.91⁎⁎⁎ 8.48⁎⁎⁎ 13.04⁎⁎⁎ 12.47⁎⁎⁎ 15.38⁎⁎⁎
1.33⁎ −1.74 −1.67 −2.57 −1.12
0.13 −0.65 1.13 0.99 0.76
0.61⁎ 0.14 0.65 0.36 0.49
0.45 −0.02 1.48⁎⁎⁎ 1.82 2.41⁎⁎
0.58 0.49 −0.12 −0.26 −2.96⁎⁎
2.39⁎⁎⁎ −0.08 5.49⁎⁎⁎ 6.35⁎⁎⁎ 3.79
1.77⁎ −0.11 2.74⁎ −0.50 3.34
0.76 0.73 −0.85 −0.98 −0.41
0.58⁎⁎ 0.41 1.55⁎⁎⁎ 1.39⁎⁎ 2.70⁎⁎⁎
0.64⁎⁎ 0.31 1.33⁎⁎⁎ 1.25 1.07
0.37 −0.75 1.55 1.37 2.04
1.13 1.13 4.81 3.91 1.96
0.60 −0.65 0.71 −0.81 2.22
0.74⁎⁎ 0.81 1.16 1.33 2.64⁎⁎
0.24 0.29 1.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.38 1.81⁎⁎⁎
0.01 −0.00 1.14⁎⁎⁎ −0.15 −0.11
0.45 0.61 0.13 −0.07 1.22
0.46 −0.20 1.78 1.58 0.44
1.56⁎⁎ −1.37 0.95 −0.61 4.07
0.59⁎⁎⁎ 0.89⁎⁎ 0.93⁎ 0.36 1.18
0.35 0.05 1.03⁎⁎ 0.47 0.95
0.62⁎ 0.03 1.10⁎ −0.75 −0.31
0.30 −1.41 −0.04 −0.60 1.88
2.08 2.18⁎ 1.68 2.05 4.01
1.05 3.51⁎ −0.43 −1.92 1.82
0.33 −1.04 1.31⁎⁎ 0.73 −0.54
those of Table 4; columns indicate the combination of estimator and panel period length
nd SR indicate permanent and transitory components of aid (see Eq. (2)); standard errors
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(country-speciﬁc trends). These terms are then added (individually) to
the baseline dynamic panel models reported in panel (1) of Table 4.
Summary results are reported in Appendix Table B3. As expected, the co-
efﬁcients on the included trend terms (not reported) are consistently
positive and highly signiﬁcant. Even so, the marginal effects associated
with aid remain positive and statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels in most cases, regardless of the ﬁlter applied. Results appear to
bemost robust for the syntheticmeasure of institutions, aswell as for ex-
ecutive constraints, checks anddemocracy. In contrast, results for judicial
independence andpolitical terror, while in thepositive domain, are often
not signiﬁcantly different from zero. The former result is in line with re-
sults from Table 5. Again, andwithout wishing to stretch the analysis too
far, one reading of these results is that aidmay have a (more) positive ef-
fect on the formal legal structure of political institutions, but less impact
on effective changes in the behavior (outcomes) of such institutions.
7. Conclusion
This study used recent extensive data on foreign aid to shed new light
on the relationship between aid and political institutions. We began by
describing some of the primary theoretical mechanisms through which
aidmay inﬂuence institutional outcomes. This suggested there is unlikely
to be a simple,monotonic relationship between the two. Rather, aidﬂows
are likely to enter a complex domestic political calculus and interact with
donor preferences regarding recipient institutions. The discussion also
highlighted that different types of aid can be expected to hold different
implications for governance. In turn, the empirical impact of aid on insti-
tutions should be considered a net effect, whose direction is ambiguous a
priori. It follows that simple assertions about the impact of aid, which lack
a robust empirical basis, are unlikely to be helpful.
The ﬁrst question we addressed in our empirical analysis concerned
the relationship between aggregate aid and political institutions. To
answer this, we used both long run cross-section and dynamic panel
approaches. Based on a wide range of estimators and alternative dy-
namic structures (panels of different lengths), we found a small positive
net effect of aggregate aid (as a share of GDP) on a synthetic measure of
political institutions. Second, we asked whether this relationship varies
across different types of aid — namely, aid given according to different
objectives and aid provided at different frequencies (transitory versusD
C
Ex
P
Jumore permanent). Applying a simple frequency decomposition, we
found that the positive association between aggregate aid and political
institutions was driven by more stable ﬂows of aid. This accords with
existing research regarding how institutions respond to different kinds
of income shocks (Brückner et al., 2012).
Extending the analysis, we found that low frequency (stable) ﬂows
of governance aid display the largest positive association with political
institutions (on average). Both economic and ‘other’ aid commitments
show a much less systematic relationship with political institutions.
However, under some speciﬁcations, the direction of their effects ap-
peared to be negative and positive respectively. Overall, this provides
support for the thesis that different types of aid have differential im-
pacts (Dietrich and Wright, 2012, 2015). Alongside the relatively small
share of aid provided explicitly for governance purposes, this explains
why the estimated aggregate effect of aid is small but positive. That is,
the estimated aggregate effect nets out aid given for diverse objectives
and at different frequencies.
The main results appear robust to endogeneity concerns. Speciﬁcal-
ly, re-running the long run cross-section estimates with instrumental
variables yields highly consistent results. Also, even when we combine
a systemGMMestimator, that treats aid as endogenous, with additional
controls for region- and country-speciﬁc trends in the outcome vari-
ables, a statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship between aid and in-
stitutions remains in the data.
We examinedwhether the same results hold over sub-measures of in-
stitutions. Overall,we foundno reason to suggest that our results are driv-
en by any one speciﬁcmetric of institutions. Nonetheless, the relationship
between (governance) aid appears least robust for judicial independence.
Lastly, we found evidence for heterogeneity both between regions and
over time. Indeed, the positive association between aid and political insti-
tutions is more apparent in the post-Cold War period. These results con-
ﬁrm the thesis that we can reasonably expect aid to be associated with
heterogeneous political economy dynamics in individual countries.
Overall, our main results hold across a wide range of alternative em-
pirical strategies. While we do not go so far as to conclude that our ﬁnd-
ings are deﬁnitively causal, they certainly provide no grounds to claim
that aid has had a systematic negative net effect on institutions, on av-
erage. Rather, the opposite view ﬁnds support. In conclusion, evidence
from individual cases suggesting that aid has had a negative impact on
institutions is unlikely to be representative.Appendix A. Data sources and description
The tables below indicate the sources and deﬁnitions of the variables used in the analysis. All variables, unless otherwise indicated, are measured
at the recipient level. ‘Primary’ indicates the original source of the variable; ‘secondary’ indicates where the aggregate Quality of Government (QoG)
database (Teorell et al., 2013) that has been used in lieu of a primary source. DPI refers to the 2012 update of the Database of Political Institutions
introduced by Beck et al. (2001); Polity IV is outlined in Jaggers and Marshall (2011); WG10 refers to Wood and Gibney (2010), which introduces
the political terror measure; and CR10 refers to the CIRI dataset described in Cingranelli and Richards (2010);WDI is theWorld Bank'sWorld Devel-
opment Indicators (also integrated into the QoG database).
Table A1
Summary of institutional variables.Variables Primary Secondary QoG id. Notesemocracy Freedom
HouseQoG fh_ipolity2 Captures the extent of democracy. Original data, taken directly from the QoG database, ranges from: 0 = “least
democratic”; to 10 = “most democratic”. Following (Hadenius and Teorell, 2005) this variable is calculated as the
average of the Freedom House polity measure (the mean of political rights and civil liberty indexes, fh_pr and fh_cl)
and the Polity IV revised combined polity score (p_polity2), both converted to a 0–10 scale.hecks DPI QoG dpi_checks Reﬂects the number of veto players over political decisions, which is the number actors whose approval is necessary
for a shift in policy. Original data ranges from 1 (lowest) to 18 (highest).ecutive constraints Polity IV QoG p_xconst Captures the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief (political) executives,
whether individuals or collectivities. Original data ranges from: 1 = “unlimited authority”; to 7 = “executive parity
or subordination”.olitical terror (–) WG10 QoG gd_ptss A reverse scale of political terror. Original data is collated from annual reports on human rights published by the U.S. State
Department and ranges from: 1 = “countries under a secure rule of law”; to 5 = “terror has expanded to the whole
population”. This original scale is reversed for the present analysis.dicial independence CR10 QoG ciri_injud Indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of
the government or the military. Original data ranges from: 0 = “not independent”; to 2 = “generally independent”.
Table A2
Summary of explanatory variables.
Variables Primary Secondary QoG id. Notes
Aid/GDP (%) AidData/WDI QoG – Current aid ﬂows (ODA loans and grants in USD) to each recipient (per year) are aggregated as described
in the text. These are converted to real values, using a price index calculated from the ratio of current to
constant GDP (PPP) from theWDI series. Real aid is divided by constant GDP (PPP) and multiplied by 100.
GDP per capita (log.) WDI QoG wdi_gdppc GDP per capita (log.) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. Data are in
constant 2005 international dollars.
Population (log.) WDI QoG wdi_pop Log. of total population.
Life expectancy WDI QoG wdi_lifexp Life expectancy at birth (years).
Total trade (% GDP) WDI QoG wdi_ttr Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP.
Urban population (%) WDI QoG wdi_urban Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as deﬁned by national statistical ofﬁces.
Oil/gas net exporter
(dummy)
R13 QoG ross_oil_netexpc,
ross_gas_netexpc
Takes a value of one if either oil or gas net exports (per capita) is greater than zero.
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Summary statistics, by region (1983–2010).
EAP ECA
(a) Checks 2.91 2.52
Democracy 5.13 5.04
Exec. constraints 4.59 4.33
Judicial indep. 0.95 0.65
Political terror (–) 3.42 3.14
Synthetic metric 18.98 −3.46
(b) Governance aid/GDP 0.96 0.27
Economic aid/GDP 1.52 0.58
Other aid/GDP 2.11 1.16
Total aid/GDP 4.60 2.00
(c) Governance aid (% total) 20.98 13.39
Economic aid (% total) 33.08 28.77
Other aid (% total) 45.93 57.84
Bilateral aid (% total) 92.64 77.23
Notes: institutional outcomes are as described in Appendix A; the ‘synthetic’ (mean)measure is
has beennormalized; aid components are as described in the text; regions are abbreviated as fol
LAC, Middle East & North Africa = MENA, South Asia = SAS, Sub-Saharan Africa = SAS. \a =
Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.LAC MENA SAS SSA Mean \a
3.18 1.25 3.50 1.98 2.56
7.44 2.58 5.34 4.31 4.97
5.55 2.51 4.35 3.36 4.11
1.09 0.66 1.06 0.88 0.88
3.23 2.79 2.54 3.20 3.05
46.45 −58.68 10.68 −15.57 −0.27
0.22 0.15 0.18 0.60 0.40
0.54 0.64 1.80 2.07 1.19
1.64 1.83 1.70 5.91 2.39
2.40 2.63 3.68 8.57 3.98
9.34 5.88 4.94 6.96 10.01
22.50 24.36 48.97 24.10 29.92
68.16 69.75 46.09 68.94 60.07
90.88 88.19 94.45 79.13 87.09
100 times themean of the ﬁve separatemeasures of institutions calculated after each one
lows: East Asia& Paciﬁc=EAP, Europe& Central Asia=ECA, Latin America & Caribbean=
means are calculated over regions.
Table B2
Cross-section regressions for disaggregated aid (1983–2010).
Mean levels Difference levels Long differences
I II III IV V VI
Governance aid/GDP 20.84⁎⁎ 28.71⁎⁎⁎ 20.03⁎⁎⁎ 22.24⁎⁎⁎ 1.36 0.09
(7.93) (7.68) (7.29) (7.79) (2.65) (2.88)
Economic aid/GDP 7.81 13.61 17.33⁎ 13.74 −7.67 −8.65
(9.38) (9.88) (8.99) (8.87) (7.67) (7.47)
Other aid/GDP −0.38 1.88 1.60 1.63 2.49 3.49⁎
(3.67) (4.05) (3.81) (3.71) (1.82) (1.94)
GDP p.c. (log.) 48.17⁎⁎⁎ 58.50⁎⁎⁎ 41.73⁎⁎ 35.86⁎⁎ −6.12 −2.81
(14.23) (17.04) (17.19) (15.87) (35.85) (35.34)
Total trade (% GDP) 0.07 0.23 0.32 0.26 0.72⁎ 0.79⁎
(0.25) (0.30) (0.27) (0.25) (0.42) (0.43)
Life expectancy 2.87⁎ 1.78 0.73 0.38 1.15 1.42
(1.53) (1.79) (1.67) (1.43) (1.72) (1.82)
Urbanization −0.01 −0.21 −0.07 0.20 1.31 1.29
(0.58) (0.68) (0.66) (0.61) (1.38) (1.42)
Oil/gas exporter −62.08⁎⁎⁎ −79.97⁎⁎⁎ −71.87⁎⁎⁎ −67.53⁎⁎⁎ −47.75 −39.52
(17.98) (19.43) (18.65) (16.94) (31.71) (30.94)
Institutions (lag) − − −0.68⁎⁎⁎ −0.68⁎⁎⁎ − 0.16
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
Outcome Mean Last Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff.
Aid variable Mean Mean Mean Mean Diff. Diff.
Control variables Mean Mean Mean Last Diff. Diff.
Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104
R2 (adjusted) 0.50 0.46 0.42 0.41 0.00 0.01
RMSE 57.71 67.06 63.50 64.22 83.15 82.88
Notes: dependent variable is the synthetic metric of institutions; second panel indicates the speciﬁcation of the outcome, aid and control variables — ‘Mean’ indicates the long run (full
period) mean, ‘Last’ indicates the most recent 6-year mean, ‘Diff.’ is the difference between the last and ﬁrst (initial) 6-year means; all models include a full set of regional ﬁxed effects;
selected coefﬁcients shown; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust.
Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.
⁎ 0.1.
⁎⁎ 0.05.
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Estimates including interaction terms with aggregate aid.
Panel Variable 2 year panels
RE BCFE
(1) Aid/GDP 0.15 0.75
(0.65) (1.20)
SSA × Aid 0.72 −0.05
(0.64) (1.22)
Asia × Aid 0.91 −0.31
(0.72) (1.35)
LAC × Aid 0.15 −0.58
(0.70) (1.46)
(2) Aid/GDP 0.61⁎⁎ 0.24
(0.29) (0.36)
GDP × Aid −0.21 −0.35
(0.18) (0.23)
(3) Aid/GDP 1.00⁎⁎⁎ 0.74⁎⁎⁎
(0.18) (0.20)
Initial instits. × Aid 0.00⁎⁎ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
(4) Aid/GDP 0.28 −0.10
(0.32) (0.39)
(Year N 1992) × Aid 0.71⁎⁎ 0.90⁎⁎
(0.32) (0.37)
Notes: dependent variable is the syntheticmetric of institutions; all aid terms are lagged one pe
interactions of the (lagged) aid term with additional control variables; standard errors (in pare
Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.
⁎ 0.1.
⁎⁎ 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ 0.01.4 year panels
GMM RE BCFE GMM
−0.60 −0.18 0.63 −2.35
(1.67) (1.23) (2.69) (3.33)
1.01 1.78 0.50 3.82
(1.62) (1.22) (2.73) (3.31)
1.96 3.22⁎⁎ 1.19 7.06⁎⁎
(1.69) (1.43) (3.18) (3.54)
1.20 1.40 1.49 9.70⁎⁎
(1.82) (1.27) (3.04) (4.63)
1.07⁎⁎ 1.60⁎⁎⁎ 1.25 2.62⁎⁎⁎
(0.51) (0.52) (0.89) (0.94)
0.31 −0.11 −0.03 0.55
(0.30) (0.31) (0.52) (0.75)
0.86⁎⁎⁎ 2.01⁎⁎⁎ 1.50⁎⁎⁎ 2.30⁎⁎⁎
(0.26) (0.36) (0.40) (0.51)
0.00 0.01⁎ 0.01⁎ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
−0.23 1.08⁎ 0.60 2.38⁎⁎
(0.56) (0.63) (0.89) (1.16)
0.93 0.88 0.94 −0.38
(0.57) (0.75) (0.92) (1.13)
riod; rows (1–4) indicate separatemodels on the form of row (1) of Table 4, augmented by
ntheses) are robust.
Table B4
Estimates including trends estimated from time series ﬁlters.
Outcome Filter 2 year panels 4 year panels
RE BCFE GMM RE BCFE GMM
Synthetic RL 0.84⁎⁎⁎ 0.61⁎⁎⁎ 0.52⁎ 1.71⁎⁎⁎ 1.27⁎⁎ 2.22⁎⁎⁎
RQ 0.84⁎⁎⁎ 0.62⁎⁎⁎ 0.51 1.71⁎⁎⁎ 1.29⁎⁎⁎ 2.21⁎⁎⁎
CL 0.68⁎⁎⁎ 0.66⁎⁎⁎ 0.68⁎⁎ 0.99⁎⁎⁎ 1.18⁎⁎⁎ 2.04⁎⁎⁎
CQ 0.30⁎⁎ 0.33⁎ 0.39 0.26⁎ 0.40 0.85⁎
Checks RL 0.94⁎⁎⁎ 0.56⁎ 0.63 2.14⁎⁎⁎ 2.44⁎⁎⁎ 2.56⁎⁎⁎
RQ 0.93⁎⁎⁎ 0.55⁎ 0.53 2.14⁎⁎⁎ 2.41⁎⁎⁎ 2.42⁎⁎⁎
CL 0.64⁎⁎ 0.68⁎ 0.74⁎ 1.13⁎⁎ 2.05⁎⁎ 2.41⁎⁎⁎
CQ 0.15 0.10 −0.09 0.38⁎ 0.92⁎⁎ 0.81⁎
Political terror (−) RL 0.56⁎⁎ 0.62⁎ 0.35 0.66 0.37 0.71
RQ 0.56⁎⁎ 0.62⁎ 0.31 0.67 0.38 0.63
CL 0.63⁎⁎⁎ 0.72⁎⁎ 0.51 0.38 0.50 0.61
CQ 0.25 0.26 0.19 −0.16 −0.55 −0.62
Exec. constraints RL 0.80⁎⁎⁎ 0.58⁎⁎ 0.43 1.58⁎⁎⁎ 1.42⁎⁎ 2.71⁎⁎⁎
RQ 0.78⁎⁎⁎ 0.58⁎⁎ 0.43 1.56⁎⁎⁎ 1.41⁎⁎ 2.77⁎⁎⁎
CL 0.56⁎⁎⁎ 0.66⁎⁎⁎ 0.44 0.78⁎⁎⁎ 1.36⁎⁎⁎ 2.31⁎⁎⁎
CQ 0.35⁎⁎⁎ 0.46⁎⁎ 0.28 0.35⁎ 0.70⁎ 1.60⁎⁎⁎
Democracy RL 0.50⁎⁎⁎ 0.23 0.29 1.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.37 1.85⁎⁎⁎
RQ 0.50⁎⁎⁎ 0.23 0.28 1.04⁎⁎⁎ 0.38 1.83⁎⁎⁎
CL 0.37⁎⁎⁎ 0.31⁎⁎ 0.32 0.45⁎⁎ 0.40 1.40⁎⁎⁎
CQ 0.26⁎⁎⁎ 0.27⁎⁎ 0.32 0.25 0.39 0.96⁎⁎
Judicial indep. RL 0.48⁎ 0.32 −0.01 1.03⁎⁎ 0.50 0.87
RQ 0.47⁎ 0.31 −0.04 1.02⁎⁎ 0.48 0.95
CL 0.23 0.14 0.35 0.33 0.08 0.82
CQ −0.11 −0.12 0.06 −0.07 −0.13 0.11
Notes: dependent variable is indicated in the ﬁrst column; cells report coefﬁcient on aggregate Aid/GDP (lagged one period), augmented by estimates of trends in the outcome variable;
trends are regional linear (RL), regional quadratic (RQ), country-speciﬁc linear (CL), country-speciﬁc quadratic (CQ); standard errors (not shown) are robust.
Source: authors' calculations from data described in Appendix A.
⁎ 0.1.
⁎⁎ 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ 0.01.
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Fig. B1. Regional means for synthetic and sub-measures of institutions. Note: all measures are standardized, taking a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Sources: see Appendix A.
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Summary of aid classiﬁcations.A
B
CAidData classiﬁcation/informationGroup 2-digit code Purpose codes Description15 15000–15261 Government and civil society
92 92000–92030 Support to NGOs
21 21005–21081 Transport and storage
22 22000–22081 Communications
23 23000–23082 Energy generation and supply
24 24000–24081 Banking and ﬁnancial services
25 25010–25081 Business and other services
31 31000–31391 Agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing
32 32000–32310 Industry, mining & construction
33 33100–33210 Trade policy, regulations and tourism
11 11000–11430 Education
12 12000–12281 General/basic health
13 13000–13801 Population policy and reproductive health
14 14000–14082 Water supply and sanitation
16 16010–16081 Other social infrastructure and services
41 41000–41082 General environmental protection
42 42010 Women
43 43010–43082 Other cross-cutting
51 51010 General budget support
52 52010 Development aid/food security assistance
53 53030–53050 Other commodity assistance
60 60010–60040 Action related to debt
70 70000 Humanitarian aid
72 72000–72050 Emergency response
73 73010 Reconstruction relief
74 74010 Disaster response and preparedness
91 91010 Administrative costs of donors
93 93010 Refugees in donor countries
99 99810–99820 UnspeciﬁedNotes: groups refer to the aid categories employed in this study; A is governance aid; B is economic aid; and C is all other aid.
Source: authors' summary from AidData v2.1 User Guide; see Tierney et al., 2011.Appendix D. Supplementary dataSupplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.09.004.
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